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Abstract—Electronic medical data sharing between stakehold-
ers, such as patients, doctors, and researchers, can promote more
effective medical treatment collaboratively. These sensitive and
private data should only be accessed by authorized users. Given a
total medical data, users may care about parts of them and other
unrelated information might interfere with the user-interested
data search and increase the risk of exposure. Besides accessing
these data, users may want to update them and propagate to
other sharing peers so that all peers keep identical data after each
update. To satisfy these requirements, in this paper we propose a
medical data sharing architecture that addresses the permission
control using smart contracts on blockchain and splits data into
fined-grained pieces shared with different peers then synchronize
full data and these pieces with bidirectional transformations.
Medical data reside on each user’s local database and permission-
related data are stored on smart contracts. Only all peers have
gained the newest shared data after updates can they start to
do next operations on it, which are enforced by smart contracts.
Blockchain-based immutable shared ledge enables users to trace
data updates history. This paper can provide a new perspective
to view full medical data as different slices to be shared with
various peers but consistency after updates between them are still
promised, which can protect privacy and improve data search
efficiency.
Index Terms—medical data, blockchain, update, bidirectional
transformations
I. INTRODUCTION
Now a lot of medical data are digitalized so as to be stored
and accessed conveniently. A medical record is produced
after a patient goes to see a doctor and often resides on the
hospital’s database. Medical records usually contain highly
sensitive information about patient privacy. HIPPA Privacy
Rule [1] in the U.S. regulates the use and disclosure of
personally identifiable health information to protect patients’
privacy. However, it is hard to make sure that all medical
institutes would follow these rules because they may expose
patient privacy for profit. Hence, transparency in medical data
management system is important. Moreover, patients might
visit different hospitals and leave their records scattered [2]
in different places, so that it is hard for them to manage
records efficiently. Patients should better to be provided with
a platform to manage and review their historical medical data
that are from different hospitals in case of exposure or being
tampered. In addition to providing data to doctors, sharing
medical data could also benefit other stakeholders such as
researchers or policy makers. For example, researchers can
identify public health risks and then develop better treatment
by analyzing large-scale medical data [3].
To protect patients’ data from being exposed or tampered,
shared medical data could reside in encrypted formats on a
trusted cloud storage server and can only be accessed by
authorized users. However, in that case, centralized access
control might lead to a single point of failure and become
the bottleneck of the sharing system. Some decentralized
medical data sharing systems [4]–[6] have been proposed to
manage authentication based on blockchain [7] technology,
which achieves consensus among distributed nodes. The ac-
cess control logic of medical data on smart contracts [4] or
Chaincode [8] can be used as a criterion to judge whether
a user can be allowed to access medical data. Only a user
satisfies that permission information can his access be agreed
by the majority of nodes, which means he is authorized from
the blockchain side.
Still, we identified a limitation on current works. Consider
that a full medical record can have many attributes, while
different parties may be only interested in specific parts of
them. For example, given a medical record, researchers are
interested in the attribute of the mechanism of medicine
action, whereas patients care more about the medicine dosage
standard attribute. Moreover, additional but unnecessary in-
formation might influence or even mislead users’ judgment.
Imagine that doctors may add some symptom description on
records which might put patients in confusion and fear [9].
Besides, treatment steps are exclusive to a hospital and should
not be directly accessed by other users.
To fill this gap, we propose an idea that a full medical data
(i.e., data source) could be split into lots of smaller pieces (i.e.,
data views). From the perspective of relational databases, these
kinds of smaller pieces can be seen as view tables derived
by querying a few but not all attributes on the base (source)
table. A user can share different fine-grained data pieces
with different users based on predefined protocols. Imagine
a doctor can share dosage usage with a patient and medicine
mechanism with a researcher respectively. In this way, only
user-concerned data are exposed to them which can avoid
additional data interference and protect private proprietary data
of data providers from being leaked.
However, if we adopt this idea, we have to dispose of two
issues as follow.
Firstly, we need to handle the synchronization between
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source and multiple views after updates on those fine-grained
views occur. Consider this scenario: a researcher updates the
medicine mechanism on shared data with a doctor. Note here
the shared data is actually a view from the full medical
data (source) on the doctor side. Thus the doctor needs to
synchronize this change on view to create a new source. To
solve this problem, we apply bidirectional transformations
[10] to synchronize them after updates on either one side.
For example, we can invoke put direction of a BX program
to reflect modifications on shared data in the full data and
get to produce shared data from full data. Because different
views produced from the same source might have overlapping
data. After the updates on shared data are reflected to doctor’s
source, the doctor still has to judge whether he needs to modify
the shared data with patients by reproducing a new view.
Secondly, we need to conduct access control on fine-grained
view data. Existing blockchain-based access control solutions,
such as [4], focused on permission control on the full record.
However, we can adapt it to work with the fine-grained
views. For example, we can encode permission information
of views into smart contracts. Shared data management should
be conducted after the peer has been authorized.
In this paper, our contributions are as follows.
1) We proposed an idea that a full medical record can be
partitioned to multiple fine-grained data pieces shared
with different peers and all data should reside on each
user’s local database.
2) We solved the data synchronization between a full record
and fine-grained data views after updates on a view by
bidirectional transformation technology.
3) We designed a decentralized medical data sharing archi-
tecture and applied blockchain to control permission for
fine-grained data views.
The remainder is organized like this. Section II gives some
preliminaries about blockchain and bidirectional transforma-
tions. Section III sketches our system design and provides
an implementation architecture. Section IV discuss security
threats of our system and potential countermeasures as our
future work. Section V compares our work with existing ones
to clarify our improvement over them. Section VI concludes
and directs our future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Blockchain
Proposed with Bitcoin [7] in 2008, blockchain technology
has been widely used in many fields. Blockchain provides a
solution for data storage, data transfer and consensus protocol
in a distributed and decentralized environment. Generally
speaking, blockchain is a shared ledger and replicated by
all nodes on a distributed network, which records the valid
historical transactions in chronologically chained blocks. The
nodes which generate new blocks by solving a computational
puzzle (the proof-of-work problem) are called miners.
Not only can support the platform of cryptocurrency, but
blockchain can also be applied to other scenes. Ethereum [11]
extends Bitcoin with a built-in Turing-Complete programming
language so that one can use this scripts (i.e., Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) bytecodes) to write programs (i.e., smart
contracts1) on the blockchain. For example, we can write
a smart contract in Solidity2 and then compile it to EVM
code. Besides the user accounts controlled by private keys
like in Bitcoin, the accounts for smart contracts are allowed
in Ethereum. Anyone can build decentralized applications
which consist of a collection of smart contracts. Once a
transaction involving smart contract creation gets confirmed,
an address is generated for the contract and later anyone can
send transactions to this address to execute the programs on it.
A smart contract transaction is enforced when a miner includes
it in a new produced block. Other nodes will validate it and
re-run contracts if it is valid.
B. Bidirectional transformations
Maintaining consistency between different data represen-
tations having overlapping contents is important [12]. For
example, in databases, a view table can be produced by
querying a base source table; this view table can be modified,
in which case we will want to “restore consistency”, i.e.,
we need to change the source such that the modified view
coincides with the result of the query on the changed source —
this is the well-known view update problem [13]. To achieve
this, one may consider providing two separate programs to
represent the two directions to propagate updates from one
side to the other. But it is hard to prove that the source and
view can still be kept consistent after updates. Bidirectional
transformations (BXs) were proposed [14] to solve this.
BX programs3 can be invoked in two ways as forward and
backward transformations. A forward transformation (denoted
as get) extracts some information from the source to build an
abstract view, and the backward transformation (denoted as
put4) embeds information of the view back into the source
and produces an updated source. This pair of transformations
should satisfy the round-tripping laws (also referred to as well-
behaveness) called PutGet and GetPut.
get(put(source, view)) = view (PutGet)
put(source, get(source)) = source (GetPut)
Intuitively, GetPut states that no update should be performed
on the source when there is no change on the view, while
PutGet hints that put should take all updates on the view
into account so that the view can be regenerated from the
updated source by get. The most distinguished point of BX
is that a view can contain only a part of a source. With
respect to some consistency between a source and a view,
BX programs can synchronize the source and view, and their
well-behavedness guarantees that the source and view are
1Hyperledger and others still provide platforms to write smart contracts.
2https://solidity.readthedocs.io/en/v0.5.2/
3The BXs we refer to in this paper are asymmetric lenses [15], one of the
synchronization models studied by the BX community.
4put is not a simple inverse of get. Instead, it accepts the view and the
original source as input and produces an updated source as output.
kept consistent after updates on either side. There are some
languages for constructing well-behaved BX programs, such
as Boomerang [16], BiGUL [17] and HOBiT [18].
III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we first describe a scenario of distributed
medical data sharing among doctor, patient, and researcher
in Section III-A and propose a system architecture to model
this scenario in Section III-B. Then we present the solutions
for synchronization between full medical record and views
using BXs and access control on views applying blockchain
in Section III-C. Our system can not only allow updates on
shared data but other operations such as creating data, which
are described in Section III-D and explained by a concrete
case in Section III-E.
A. Scenario description
Table ”Full medical records” in Figure 1 shows patients’ full
medical records which includes seven attributes: a0. patient ID,
a1. medication name, a2. clinical Data, a3. address, a4. dosage,
a5. mechanism of action, a6. mode of action. Suppose there are
three users: Patient, Researcher, and Doctor. Each user only
stores some attributes of full records on their local databases.
For instance, Patient only keeps the attributes from a0 to a4
on Table D1 and Researcher retains attribute a1, a5 and a6 on
Table D2. Doctor manages attributes a0-a2, a4, and a5 on Table
D3 and generates two view tables D31 and D32 by querying
special attributes from D3. D31 and D32 are used to be shared
with Patient and Researcher respectively. Note that D13 and
D31 are identical tables but D13 is stored in Patient’s database
and D31 resides in Doctor’s database. Similarly, attributes a1
and a5 are shared between Researcher and Doctor, which are
shown in the view Table D23 on Researcher’s database and
Table D32 on Doctor’s storage. We note that the formats and
contents of shared data are predefined by sharing peers.
B. System architecture
Our system architecture is shown in Fig. 2, which contains
following components:
• Client side controls the interaction between users and
other components.
• Server App acts as a mediator to interact with other
components.
• Blockchain keeps the manage permission of shared data
on smart contracts and notifies sharing peers the change
on them.
• Database manager disposes of the synchronization be-
tween shared data and local data according to consistency
logic relations. These synchronizations are implemented
by executing BX programs.
• Database: each user has a full database and many data
pieces shared with other users. The latter (seen as a view)
can always be reproduced from the former (seen as a
source).
Now we discuss details about this architecture.
a0. 
Patient ID 
a1. 
Medication
Name
a2. 
Clinical Data
a3. 
Address a4. Dosage
188 Ibuprofen CliD1 Sapporo one tablet every 4h
D1 (Patient)
a0. 
Patient 
ID 
Medication 
Name
Clinical 
Data
Mechanism 
of Action Dosage
188 Ibuprofen CliD1 MeA1 one tablet every 4h
189 Wellbutrin CliD2 MeA2 100 mg twice daily
D3 (Doctor)
a0. 
Patient ID 
a1. 
Medication Name
a2. 
Clinical Data a4. Dosage
188 Ibuprofen CliD1 one tablet every 4h
D13 (also D31)
a1. 
Medication 
Name
a5. 
Mechanism 
of Action
a6. Mode 
of Action
Ibuprofen MeA1 MoA1
Wellbutrin MeA2 MoA2
D2 (Researcher) D23 (also D32)
a1. Medication 
Name
a5. Mechanism 
of Action
Ibuprofen MeA1
Wellbutrin MeA2
Full medical records
a0. 
Patient 
ID 
a1. 
Medication
Name
a2. 
Clinical 
Data
a3. 
Address
a4. 
Dosage
a5. 
Mechanism 
of Action
a6. 
Mode of 
Action
188 Ibuprofen CliD1 Sapporo one tablet every 4h MeA1 MoA1
189 Wellbutrin CliD2 Osaka 100 mg twice daily MeA2 MoA2
a0. 
Patient ID 
a1. 
Medication 
Name
a2. 
Clinical 
Data
a5. 
Mechanism 
of Action
a4. Dosage
188 Ibuprofen CliD1 MeA1 one tablet every 4h
189 Wellbutrin CliD2 MeA2 1 0 mg twice daily
Fig. 1. Data distribution
Researcher 
Client side
Server side
Server App
BX
BX
Database Manager
Block Block Block Block Block
Blockchain
Doctor 
Client side
Server side
Server App
Database Manager
BX
BX
Send updated data
Request updated data
Fig. 2. System Architecture
Firstly, medical data always stay in each peer’s local
database and data transfer only exists between sharing peers,
which avoid data being leaked to the third party so as to keep
shared data security. The data can not only be provided by
doctors. Instead, each node can be a shared data provider. As
referred in [19], many clinics encourage patients to collect data
by themselves that are supposed to be gathered by doctors
and expect to increase clinic efficiency and promote patient
awareness.
Moreover, blockchain’s consensus protocol scheme keeps
the shared data between sharing peers the same after updates
since each peer will receive the notification from contracts and
request new shared data from other sharing peers. Additionally,
any modification on shared data can be recorded on the
blockchain. Blockchain properties such as immutability, au-
ditablility, and transparency enable nodes to check and review
update history on shared data. Still, simultaneously updates to
the same shared data by multiple peers are forbidden. Smart
contracts dispose of the updates according to received requests
in chronological order. If a transaction for updates on shared
data has been included in a block, then other requests on this
shared data will not be accepted, i.e., one block can contain
one transaction at most on some shared data at one time. This
can promise that only when all sharing peers have had the
newest shared data can they execute further operations.
C. System design
1) Synchronization between source and views: As we said
before, BX programs are used to synchronize the full data and
shared data. Shared data can be seen as views which can be
produced from full records named as sources. For example
in Fig. 1, Table D13 is shared by Patient and Doctor and
can be produced from D1 by BX13-get (i.e., applying the get
direction of the BX program between D1 and D13). If D13 is
modified, then D1 need to be updated from original D1 and
D13 by using BX13-put(i.e., invoking put the direction of the
BX program between D1 and D13) to ensure that the modified
D13 can be regenerated from the updated D1.
In our design, shared data between any two peers are
not exposed to the third party, which can keep data privacy
between them to some degree. For example, any operations on
D23 or D32 can only be known by Researcher and Doctor and
Patient has no information about this. However, If D31 and
D32 have some overlapping data, after D32 is modified, D31
might need to be regenerated by using BX31-get on modified
D3 which can be produced by applying BX32-put.
2) Access control on views: Figure 3 presents a metadata
collection table which dictates the update permission on each
attribute of the shared data. These kinds of tables reside
in smart contracts on the blockchain. Each metadata entry
corresponds to a shared table. For example, the entry for D13
or D31 declares that it is shared by Patient and Doctor and
Doctor can update all attributes value but Patient can only
change the clinical data. The “Latest Update Time” shows
when the metadata was modified most recently. The value on
the attribute “Authority to Change Permission” indicates the
Metadata ID Sharing peers Write permission Last Update  Time
Authority to 
change 
permission
D13 & D31 Patient, Doctor 2018.12.22 Doctor
D23 & D32 Doctor, Researcher 2018.12.23 Researcher
Medication 
Name Dosage
Clinical 
Data
Doctor Doctor Patient, Doctor
Medication Name Mechanism of Action
Doctor, 
Researcher Researcher
Fig. 3. Metadata collection in smart contract
user who can modify other users’ permission. For instance,
because D13 and D31 are initially produced by Doctor and
shared with Patient and then Doctor can change Patient’s
access permission. Doctor can change the permission for
updating “Dosage” from “Doctor” to “Doctor, Patient” so that
Patient can also update the “Dosage” later.
If users want to share data, they need to form an agreement
on the structure of the shared table and register the correspond-
ing metadata on smart contracts. Suppose Doctor initiates the
data sharing with Patient. According to their agreement, he
will deploy a smart contract on blockchain which stipulates
the metadata about the shared data, such as sharing peers (i.e.,
Patient and Doctor) and so on.
D. Data Management
In Fig. 4, we briefly sketch the procedures for CRUD
(i.e., Create, Read, Update, Delete) operations on shared data
considering entry level or table level. For Read operation, since
shared data stay in users’ local databases, they can just execute
a query to get the shared data. We describe the workflow for
updating an item on Section III-E.
Researcher 
Client side
Server side
Server App
BX
BX
Database Manager
Block Block Block Block Block
Blockchain
Doctor 
Client side
Server side
Server App
Database Manager
BX
BX
Send updated data
Request updated data
Entry Level/ Table Level
Create, 
Update, 
Delete
1. A user tries to execute operation locally and send a 
request (a transaction) to smart contract.
2. Smart contracts verify permission.
3. If this user is authorized then execute following 
steps. (If permission denied, then this request failed)
4. Smart contracts notify sharing peers of modification.
5. Sharing peers fetch this update on shared data.
6. Update metadata on contract.
7. Sharing peers conduct BX programs to reflect the 
change on shared data in complete data.
Read Query local database directly
Fig. 4. CRUD operations on shared data
E. Case analysis for updating shared data
Figure 5 depicts a scenario where the researcher initiates
the update the shared data. We use notations in Fig. 1. The
numbers indicate the corresponding operations sequence. The
red and blue circles indicate the updated places. Steps 1 - 5
and Steps 7 - 11 perform procedures for an operation on Fig.
4. Notably, Step 6 checks whether D32 and D31 have some
dependencies since they might have some overlapping data.
Our work leaves the initialization of shared data to future work
and we only consider management on existing shared data.
Doctor 
Researcher Patient 
Blockchain
D3
D32D31
BX31 - get BX32 - put
D13
D1
BX13 - put
D23
D2
BX23 - get
Smart Contract
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
BX13 - get
node
node
node
nodenode
nodenode
Fig. 5. A workflow for updating data fields of shared data
Let us try to describe this workflow using the data in Fig. 1.
After updating the “MeA1” on D2, the Researcher wants to
propagate the update to the shared data D23 so he uses the
BX23-get to regenerate D23 (Step 1). Then he will call a
smart contract via a trusted node connected to blockchain by
sending the request for updates to the D23 (Step 2). Note
that the smart contract in Fig. 3 records all permission info
about that D23. The smart contract will be executed until all
nodes form a consensus on this update request, which means
Researcher is permitted to update D23. Each node will conduct
the smart contract locally. The entry related D23 & D32 of the
contract is modified and the Doctor will receive notification
that D32 needs to be modified (Step 3). Then he will ask for
data from Researcher by sending a data request message and
use the latest shared data to refresh D32 (Step 4). After that,
Doctor will use BX32-put to reflect the change on D32 in
D3, i.e., update the “MeA1” to a new name (Step 5). Since
Doctor shared some data (D31) with Patient, he needs to check
whether D31 needs to be reproduced (Step 6). (If there is no
need to reproduce, Step 6 - 11 will not be performed.) For
example, Doctor may want to modify the “Dosage” on D31.
He will use BX31-get to regenerate D31 (Step 7) and request
smart contract for permission to update D13 (Step 8). Once
allowed, Patient will receive a notification about the change on
“Dosage” (D31) (Step 9) and ask Doctor to send the updated
D31. After Patient gets the modified D31 (Step 10), he will
use this to update D1 via BX13-put (Step 11).
IV. THREATS AND COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we identify some threats to our system and
propose relating countermeasures.
1) Throughput: We might employ smart contracts to control
access to shared data. Usually, the block creation time is
approximately 12 seconds on Ethereum. We argue that this
time interval is acceptable since nodes may choose to collect
a lot of updates and then send requests to contracts. It is not
so urgent for a patient or doctor to get the immediate updated
shared data.
2) Correctness of smart contracts: Smart contracts might
be inconsistent with specifications. We may apply some theo-
rem prover such as Coq [20] to verify the correctness of smart
contracts to prevent these attacks.
3) Public blockchain: Once deployed to the public
Ethereum blockchain, transactions related to our systems
might not be chosen into a block by miners. So a private
blockchain might be a better choice for our system.
4) Incentive: Like in [21], we do not include any incentive
for mining beyond the use of our system. We presume that
all nodes on the blockchain already have incentives to keep
medical data from being illegal access or updates.
V. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review existing blockchain-based re-
search on the medical data sharing field and list the advantages
of our system compared with them.
The idea of introducing Blockchain technology to healthcare
was presented firstly in [22] where they use blockchain for
data storage to guarantee that medical data cannot be modified
by anyone. Also, they designed a Healthcare Data Gateway
(HDG) to control access to the shared data. However, the
medical data size can become huge so that the data become
burdens for blockchain nodes’ storage since each node has
the same copy of blockchain. Usually, the size of metadata is
smaller than data. (It also depends on the structure of metadata
and data.) We store metadata on smart contracts so as to reduce
the storage pressure for each blockchain node.
MedRec [4] chose to store raw medical data on providers’
database and patients can download the data from it after
authorized by smart contracts on the blockchain. They aimed
to enable patients to engage in their healthcare. Whereas in our
system, all parties, such as doctors, patients, and researchers
can benefit from sharing data with others. MedRec recognized
that not all provider data such as physician intellectual prop-
erty can be exposed to patients [23], [24] so that they do
not claim to manage contents automatically from physician’s
output. Instead, we allow each node to share a piece of medical
data not total but still keep consistency between them after the
updates to the shared ones. Additionally, any modifications on
data shared by two nodes will not be disclosed to the third
party which keeps the consistency only exists in sharing peers.
Moreover, since all shared data with others can be a part of
each nodes’ local total databases, we can decide whether one
shared data have some influence on the other shared pieces
and then propagate this change to the third party.
Dubovitskaya et al. gave an architecture for managing and
sharing medical data for cancer patient care [8]. They stored
encrypted categorized shared data on the cloud and related
metadata in blockchain and implemented the prototype on
Hyperledger [25]. The access control policy is defined in the
chaincode Logic by patients. Whereas we think that each data
provider, not just patients can use smart contracts to encode
the control policy when they deploy them to blockchain.
Notably, these three solutions and others [5], [6], [21], [26],
[27] mostly targeted the access problem on shared data but did
not pay much attention to updates on them. Additionally, they
presumed that different parties can share the same data. Unlike
them, we aim to solve the update issues on the shared data
and allow one party to split full data (i.e., source) into multiple
pieces (i.e, views) which are shared with different parties but
still keep consistency between source and views.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medical data sharing is necessary and important, which
allows stakeholders on medical scenarios to contribute their
knowledge to better the medical treatment. Users may have
different interests in the same full medical record. Some
peers might update some values of fields in the existing data.
These updates need to be propagated to sharing peers. Our
architecture divides a record into pieces that shared with
different users separately, which can protect data privacy by
limiting essential data between two peers and reduce the
unrelated data interference. Any updates on data pieces can be
synchronized to full records by bidirectional transformations.
Moreover, based on smart contracts on the blockchain, we
can promise that only authorized users can update the existing
shared data and only when all peers have updated to the latest
data contents can they continue the operations on shared data.
We are still developing the prototype to implement our idea.
In the future, we will use real patient data to do experiments
but use some de-identification technology to protect patient
data from being exposed.
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